In this paper, we integrate supply chain risk management with a government-terrorist game conducted in war zones (such as Afghanistan and Iraq). The equilibrium outcomes of wargames depend on the government's resources delivered through military supply chains, which are subject to disruptions such as natural disasters and terrorism. We study the government's optimal pre-disruption preparation strategies, including inventory protection and capacity backup protection. Considering the uncertainties (e.g., the outage length of a disruption and the level of resources available to the terrorist), we conduct Monte Carlo simulation experiments to numerically investigate the benefits using our disruption preparation strategies compared with other strategies.
zones, which are subject to disruptions such as natural disasters and terrorism. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no existing studies on the integration of supply chain risk management and wargames. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents two disruption preparation models (inventory protection model and capacity backup model); Section 3 presents numerical Monte Carlo simulation-based models to examine the benefits of our disruption preparation models by comparing with other strategies; and Section 4 concludes the paper and provides some future research directions.
MODELING FRAMEWORK
As suggested by Zhuang and Bier (2007) , governments and terrorists jointly determine their efforts at equilibrium in wargames, and their equilibrium utilities depend on the available resources delivered to war zones, which are subject to military supply chain disruptions. In our paper, we allow the government to decide the amount of resources delivered to war zones and the investment in risk management (inventory or capacity backup) against disruptions. On the other hand, the terrorist's resource is assumed to be given exogenously, and we do not study the terrorist's risk management (partially due to their limited finance and capacities). The above assumptions are reasonable since government often has the ability to obtain needed resources (e.g., transferring funds from other government branches), while it might be difficult for many terrorist organizations to do the same. As Figure 1 shows, we consider two protection mechanisms the government may invest in: inventory protection and capacity backup protection. Both of which are interesting and realistic: after a disruption occurs, some fast, expendable resources (e.g., bullets and bombs) are difficult to supply through backup capacity providers in a timely manner, while some other resources could not be held in inventory for a long time (e.g., food and medicines). For the sake of simplicity, we consider one single generic resource and analyze these two protection mechanisms separately.
We acknowledge that, in reality, the supply chain network may be very complex (e.g., different nodes could be supported by different inventories or backup suppliers). However, in this paper, we only consider a single capacity backup provider and assume that the daily needed resource can be fully satisfied by this provider.
As Figure 2 shows, we let one period consist of peace time (which starts at the end of the last-period disruption and ends at the beginning of the current-period disruption) and failure time (which stars from the beginning of the current-period disruption and ends when the disruption influence ends). Hence, the length of each period depends on two factors: the peace time length and the failure time length. Table 1 introduces the notation that is used throughout the paper. We assume that the government's optimal payoff in the war zone for each period is given by r r+R · v. This may be obtained by solving a simultaneous-more game between a government and a terrorist, whose defense and attack efforts are bounded by r and R, respectively (Zhuang and Bier 2007) . On the other hand, we consider that the government maximizes her total expected payoff in war zone, subtracting the expected cost on preparation against disruptions, which is a function of the government's resource r and the inventory level I (for inventory protection mechanism).
Inventory Protection Mechanism
We first consider that the government holds a certain amount of inventory in peace time as a preparation against disruptions, and uses this inventory during the outage time (which is denoted by L). Equation (1) below shows the government's expected utility, using the inventory protection model.
During peace time, the government holds inventory I, costing h · I per day. When a disruption occurs, the inventory position decreases with a rate of r and, hence, holding cost decreases with a rate of h · r until the inventory is empty. After the inventory is empty, we assume that the government experiences a revenue loss at a rate of m. Therefore, we have the total expected utility of government over one period:
Capacity Backup Mechanism
Using the capacity backup mechanism, the government does not hold inventory but, instead, she reserves the backup supplier before disruptions and consumes the capacity backup during the outage time (after a disruption occurs). Equation (2) below provides the government's total expected utility when using capacity backup as preparation against disruptions. The government pays the reservation fee at a rate of α during the entire period and the usage fee at a rate of β during the outage time. Therefore, we have the government's expected utility:
With the inventory protection / capacity backup mechanism, the government may balance the preparation cost and the failure loss in order to maximize her overall expected utility. To investigate the impact of preparation on the government's utility, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the benefit that the government would receive when using protection strategies based on our modeling frameworks, as compared with other strategies.
Design of Numerical Experiments
We have designed two sets of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in order to study the inventory protection mechanism and capacity backup mechanism in Section 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Table  2 summarizes the baseline input parameter values. In each Monte Carlo simulation experiment, we randomly generate the following four parameters: peace time (X), outage length (L), time required to bring capacity backup online (D, for capacity backup model only), and terrorist resources (R). We also assume that each of these parameters follows a triangular distribution with a lower limit (LL), a mode (MO), and a upper limit (UL) (as shown in Table 2 ). 
Impact of Inventory Protection Mechanism on Optimal Government's utility
In this section, we compare the inventory protection policy based on our Inventory Protection model provided in Section 2.1 with two policies that the government may use:
• Police A: Zero inventory policy, i.e., I = 0;
• Police B: Mean outage length inventory policy, i.e., by some means (e.g., using some historical data), the government may have an estimate of the mean outage length (μ outage ) and set the inventory level equal to I = μ outage · r.
In the following, we call the above two policies Police A and Police B together as the Fixed Inventory Level Policy, and under the randomly generated scenarios of X, L, and R, we present the corresponding numerical model to calculate the government's utility (z 1 ) as follows:
where I = 0 (zero inventory policy) or I = μ outage · r (mean outage length inventory policy).
Inventory Protection Numerical Model
Based on the baseline case described in Section 3.1, Equation (1) becomes:
where
. We denote the optimal solution pair (r * , I * ) to Equation (4) as Best Response Policy. For the baseline case (as shown in Table 2 ), we calculate the optimal government's policy to maximize the expected government's utility denoted as z * 0 (I * , r * ). To examine whether the Best Response Policy performs well under randomly generated scenarios, we introduce z * 2 as the government's utility with the Best Response Policy, and realized under the randomly generated scenarios of X, L and R:
Under each randomly generated set of parameters (X, L, and R), we find the optimal government's policy to maximize the government's utility (z 3 ):
Note that, in reality, it might be impossible for the government to know a disruption scenario (X, L, and R) before developing a preparation plan (the Ideal Preparation Policy), i.e., we can view z * 3 as the Ideal Government's Utility.
In the following, in order to quantitatively further investigate the benefit of using the Best Response Policy we compare the Best Response Policy with the Fixed Inventory Level Policy and the Ideal Preparation Policy.
Experiment Procedure for Inventory Protection Model
The experiment is designed according to the following procedure:
Step 1:
Use Equation (4) to find the government's optimal resource r * and the optimal inventory level I * for the baseline case (as shown in Table 2 ); record r * , I * , and the corresponding government's optimal utility z * 0 (I * , r * ).
Step 2:
Randomly generate 100 sets of the following three parameters: X, L, and R.
Step 3:
For each set of randomly generated parameters (X, L, and R), calculate and record the government's utility z A * 1 ≡ z * 1,I=0,r=r , wherer is the optimal solution to Equation (3) with I = 0 obtained by using simulation optimization method as shown below:
• Sub-Step 3.1: Consider the following possible levels of r: r i = i, ∀i = 0,1, · · · , 800.
• Sub-Step 3.2: For each level of r, r = r i , i = 0, 1, · · · , 800, under the 100 sets of three randomly generated parameters (X, L, and R), use Equation (3) to calculate the corresponding 100 values of z 1,I=0,r=r i , and record the average valuez 1,I=0,r=r i .
• Sub-Step 3.3: Compare allz 1,I=0,r=r i , i = 0, 1, ..., 800, findr ≡ r i * = arg max r i {z 1,I=0,r=r i }, and recordr.
Step 4:
For each set of randomly generated parameters (X, L, and R), calculate and record the government's utility z B * 1 ≡ z *
1,I=μ outage ·r,r=r
, wherer is the optimal solution to Equation (3) with I = μ outage · r obtained by using the simulation optimization method as demonstrated in Sub-
Step 3.1-3.3.
Step 5:
For each set of randomly generated parameters (X, L, and R), calculate and record the government's utility z * 2 ≡ z * 2,I=I * ,r=r * by using Equation (5), and the government's optimal utility z * 3 by using Equation (10).
Step 6:
Under each set of generated parameters, calculate and record:
• 1 |, representing the percent increase of utility that the government would experience, if the government invests in inventory preparedness using the Best Response Policy, as compared to using Policy A and Policy B, which were introduced in Section 3.2.
• The value ω 23 = (z * 2 − z * 3 )/|z * 3 |, which represents the difference between the government's utility using the Best Response Policy and the Ideal Government's Utility.
Step 7:
Find the sample means of ω A , ω B , and ω 23 , and denote them by ω A , ω B , and ω 23 , respectively.
Step 8:
Find the sample standard deviations of ω A , ω B , and ω 23 , and denote them as s ω A , s ω B , and s ω 23 , respectively.
Simulation Results
The simulation results of the experiment are shown in Table 3 . Observation 1: On average, using the Best Response Policy against disruptions is much better than using the Fixed Inventory Level Policy. Table 3 shows that the average percent gains of the government's utility due to using the Best Response Policy, compared with the Fixed Inventory Level Policy, are 260.17%, with the fixed inventory level equal to zero (Policy A) and 21.11%, and with the fixed inventory level equal to The simulation results imply that the government can gain a significant increase in the utility, if the government prepares for supply chain disruptions based on the Best Response Policy presented in this paper, rather than on the Fixed Inventory Level Policy.
Recall that, in order to calculate the inventory protection level I * of the Best Response Policy, we consider a triangle distribution for the length of outage; but under the Fixed Inventory Level Policy with I = μ outage · r, only the mean outage length is taken into consideration (i.e., less information about the length of the outage is considered). Therefore, it is reasonable and intuitive to observe that the government experiences utility gain by using the Best Response Policy in place of the Fixed Inventory Level Policy.
Note that, if we consider the range length of a random variable
· λ , we will have the baseline case corresponding to λ = 1. We keep Q MO constant, but increase the value of λ from λ = 1 to λ = 1.5; i.e., the ranges of the three randomly generated parameters are enlarged. Based on our simulation results (as shown in Table 3 ), we have: 
Observation 2: On average, the more uncertainties associated with disruptions (higher λ value), the more gain the government experiences by using the Best Response Policy against disruptions, as compared to using the Fixed Inventory Level Policy.
Increasing the range of the outage length affects the inventory protection level I * of the Best Response Policy; however, since we used a symmetric triangle distribution of the outage length (i.e., the mean outage length does not change with the value of λ ), the Best Response Policy will perform even better, as compared to the Fixed Inventory Level Policy, when there are more uncertainties associated with disruptions. Table 3 shows that, compared with the Ideal Government's Utility, the average percent loss due to using the Best Response Policy |ω 23 |, is 15.71% (and a 90% CI for the true mean of ω 23 is [−18.75%, −12.67%]) when λ = 1.5, and |ω 23 | = 9.39% (and a 90% CI for the true mean of ω 23 is [−10.71%, −8.07%]) when λ = 1.
Observation 3: On average, the government's utility under the Best Response Policy is close to the Ideal Government's Utility.
The above two average errors, (ω 23 = −9.39% for the case of λ = 1 and ω 23 = −15.71% for the case of λ = 1.5), are almost certainly smaller than the potential estimation errors in the input data, many of which can only be roughly estimated. Our observation suggests that the potential benefits of using a more accurate input data set is positive, but may not be worth the cost. In short, if the government uses our inventory protection model against disruptions, roughly knowing the input data might be adequate. 
Impact of Capacity Backup Mechanism on Optimal Government's utility
In this section, we compare the capacity backup protection policy, based on our Capacity Backup model, with the no-capacity-backup-preparation policy that the government may use. In the following, we call such policy No Capacity Backup Policy, and the corresponding numerical model to calculate the government's utility (z 1 ) is as follows:
Capacity Backup Numerical Model
Based on the baseline case described in Section 3.1 and Equation (2), we have the following Capacity Backup numerical model to calculate the government's utility (z 0 ):
The optimal expected government's utility z * 0 (r * ) is a function of the government's optimal resource r * , which is calculated under the baseline case as shown in Table 2 . In the following, we refer the policy, making use of both the capacity backup and the government's optimal resource level, as the Best Response Policy.
To examine whether the Best Response Policy performs well under randomly generated scenarios, we introduce z * 2 as the government's utility, with the Best Response Policy for each randomly generated set of parameters (X, L, D, and R):
Under each randomly generated set of parameters (X, L, D, and R), given that the government adopts the capacity backup preparation mechanism against disruptions, we calculate the optimal government's resource level in order to maximize the government's utility (z 3 ):
As indicated in Section 3.2, z * 3 can be considered the Ideal Government's Utility, while the corresponding optimal policy can be viewed as the Ideal Preparation Policy.
In the following, in order to further investigate the quantitative benefit of using the Best Response Policy, we compare the Best Response Policy with the No Capacity Backup Policy and the Ideal Preparation Policy.
Experiment Procedure for Capacity Backup Model
The experiment procedure is as follows:
Use Equation (8) to find the government's optimal resource r * for the baseline case (as shown in Table 2 ); calculate the government's optimal utility z * 0 (r * ); record r * and z * 0 .
Step 2:
Randomly generate 100 sets of the following four parameters: X, L, D, and R.
For each set of generated parameters (X, L, D, and R), calculate and record the government's utility z * 1 ≡ z * 1,r=r according to Equation (7), wherer is the optimal solution to Equation (7) obtained by using simulation optimization method as shown below:
• Sub-Step 1: Consider the following possible levels of r: r i = i, ∀i = 0,1, · · · , 800.
• Sub-Step 2: For each level of r, r = r i , i = 0, 1, ..., 800, use the 100 sets of four randomly generated parameters (X, L, D, and R) and Equation (7) to calculate the corresponding 100 values of z 1,r=r i ; record the average valuez 1,r=r i .
• Sub-Step 3: Compare allz 1,r=r i , i = 0, 1, ..., 800, findr ≡ r i * = arg max r i {z 1,r=r i }, and record r.
For each set of the generated parameters, calculate and record the government's utility z * 2 ≡ z * 2,r=r * according to Equation (9), and the optimal government's utility z * 3 according to Equation (10).
Under each set of generated parameters, calculate and record: • the value ω = (z * 2 − z * 1 )/|z * 1 |, representing the percent increase of utility that the government would experience if she invests in capacity backup preparedness;
• the value ω 23 = (z * 2 − z * 3 )/|z * 3 |, representing the difference between the government's utility using the Best Response Policy and the Ideal Government's Utility.
Step 6:
Find the sample means of ω and ω 23 , and denote them as ω and ω 23 , respectively.
Step 7:
Find the sample standard deviations of ω and ω 23 , and denote them by s ω and s ω 23 , respectively.
Simulation Result
The simulation results of the experiment are shown in Table 4 . Figure 4 demonstrates z * 1 (the government's utility using the No Capacity Backup Policy), z * 2 (the government's utility using the Best Response Policy), and z * 3 (the Government's Ideal Utility). The average percent gain of the government's utility, due to investment in capacity backup preparedness, is 69.41% (as shown in Table 4 ), while a 90% CI for the true mean of ω is [40.19%, 98 .62%], which implies that, if government prepares against supply chain disruptions using the capacity backup model presented in Section 2, the increase in the government's utility is significant.
In the baseline case we use λ = 1 to determine the ranges of four randomly generated parameters. Here, we keep Q MO (Q ∈ {X, L, D, R}) constant, but increase the value of λ to λ = 1.5; i.e., the ranges of all four randomly generated parameters are enlarged. Based on our simulation results for the case of λ = 1.5, we show that ω = 109.11% (as shown in Table 4 Observation 6: On average, the more that uncertainties are associated with disruptions, the more gain the government experiences by using the capacity backup protection mechanism, compared with using no capacity backup.
By comparing z * 2 with z * 3 , we investigate the difference between using the Best Response Policy and using the Ideal Preparation Policy. Our simulation results shows that:
• when λ = 1, ω 23 = −1.07% (as shown in Table 4 ) and a 90% CI for the true mean of ω 23 is [−1.33%, −0.81%]; • when λ = 1.5, ω 23 = −3.11% (as shown in Table 4 ) and a 90% CI for the true mean of ω 23 is [−3.91%, −2.30%].
Observation 7: On average, the government's utility under the Best Response Policy is very close to the Ideal Government's Utility.
Note that, under both policies, the government uses the capacity backup against disruptions. The only difference is in the government's resource level under each policy, which may have relatively little impact on the government's utility.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In war zones, a government's performance may be dramatically affected by disruptions to military supply chains. Fortunately, the impact of disruptions may be mitigated by pre-disruption preparation mechanisms. In this paper, we have investigated two protection mechanisms (inventory protection mechanism and capacity backup protection mechanism), and their impact on the government's total expected utility in wargames.
Under our inventory protection model, the government's objective is to maximize the total expected utility by balancing the trade-off between the protection cost of inventory preparation and the warzone disadvantage caused by military supply chain disruptions. We conducted a set of Monte Carlo simulation-based experiments to compare the Best Response Policy with the Fixed Inventory Level Policy. We observed that, on average, using the Best Response Policy against disruptions is much better than using the Fixed Inventory Level Policy. Furthermore, we found that when there were more uncertainties associated with disruptions, the government would experience greater gains by using the Best Response Policy, as compared with the Fixed Inventory Level Policy. We also compared the Best Response Policy with the Ideal Preparation Policy and found that the government's utility of using the Best Response Policy is close to the utility when using the Ideal Preparation Policy, which implies that knowing only the approximate input data might be adequate, since the potential benefit of using a more accurate input data set is probably not worth the costs.
Under the capacity backup model, our simulation results show that, on average, using the Capacity Backup Policy against disruptions is much better than using the No Capacity Backup Policy; and furthermore, the government's utility of using the Capacity Backup Policy is very close to the Ideal Government's Utility.
Interesting future research directions in this under-studied field of integrating supply chain risk management with wargames include:
• Combining the inventory protection and capacity backup protection to against disruptions; • Investigating multiperiod inventory protection plan, integrated with a multi-period wargame;
• Extending the single-resource model to multiple-resource one; and • Extending our single capacity backup model to a more complex one that considers multiple capacity backup providers; furthermore, selecting suitable capacity backup supplier(s) from the candidate pool according to capacity flexibility, capacity cost, and reliability may be considered.
